Federal Reserve: How not to stop inflation by Milton Friedman
L
et me turn to my topic for
tonight, “How not to stop 
inflation.” As you know, the word
“inflation” has a great many different
meanings and people attribute different
conceptions to it. What we mostly
mean by it, and what I shall mean by it,
is a rise in prices, in prices in general. 
In the past year or so, we have been 
having a tendency for a rather wide-
spread rise in prices. That tendency
seems to give every sign of intensifying
and increasing, so we have a real 
problem of inflation.
If inflation does consist in a rise of
prices — in the price of meat going 
up, of wages, and of all sorts of things
— then it seems most natural to say
that the way to stop it is to stop prices
from rising. If you want to stop infla-
tion, let’s just pass a law saying that no
price shall rise. That will stop it. The
main theme of my talk tonight is 
to say that this tempting way to stop
inflation is the way not to stop it. 
It will not in fact cure inflation, but
even if it did, it would be a cure that is
worse than the disease. This approach
is like saying that if it’s getting too 
hot in this room, the way to solve the
problem is to break the thermometer.
This analogy is suggestive but does
not go far enough. If you broke the 
thermometer, that would neither
make it hotter nor do any other harm.
It would just simply prevent a signal 
of the rising temperature from being
seen. Prices partly do measure pres-
sure, but they also affect the course 
of events. Perhaps a better analogy is
the following: When it gets too hot 
in this room, close all the outlets from
the furnace while letting the furnace
run full blast until it bursts. That is
more nearly a correct analogy to hold-
ing down particular wages and prices
as a means of stopping inflation.
The question is, why is that a bad
way to stop inflation? What harm does
it do? In trying to suggest to you the
answer to those questions, I want to
talk about two main points. The first
point is to discuss what the source 
of inflation is. If I were putting it as 
a topic for a Sunday sermon and 
could speak French, I would say,
instead of “Cherchez la femme” —
“Cherchez la monnaie.” “Look for the
money.” Inflation is always and every-
where a monetary phenomenon. That
is the first point I want to discuss. 
The second point I want to discuss
is that while we ordinarily talk about
distinguishing between inflation and
deflation, between rising prices and
falling prices, there’s another distinc-
tion that I think is even more
important. That is the distinction
between open inflation and sup-
pressed inflation, between an inflation
in which prices are permitted to rise
and an inflation in which prices are
held down. While inflation is bad, it is
far better to have it open than it is to
have it suppressed. Suppressed infla-
tion is the case in which the cure is
worse than the disease, like pouring
coal into the furnace while locking all
places where the steam can get out
until the furnace blows up.
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EDITOR’S NOTE: High and rising in-
flation can tempt policymakers to enact
quick “fixes,” such as wage and price 
controls. But as Milton Friedman argues in
this speech, delivered in February 1966 to
the Detroit chapter of the University 
of Chicago Alumni Association, such 
controls don’t get at the fundamental
source of inflation — excessive expansion
of the money supply — and eventually
make the problem worse. While in effect,
the controls often result in shortages of
goods, and when they are removed, the
inflationary pressures that have been 
bottled up artificially tend to explode. 
Only five years after Friedman deliv-
ered this speech, President Richard Nixon
enacted a program of wage and price 
controls. The system was supposed to last
only 90 days but proved to be far less 
temporary, surviving in modified form for
nearly three years. The results were 
predictable. The legislation was greeted
with initial enthusiasm, but its problems
were quickly apparent. By the mid-1970s,
inflation had reached double digits. In his
memoirs, Friedman wrote that Nixon’s
decision to impose the controls “did far
more harm to the country than any of the
later actions that led to his resignation.”
Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize 
in economics in 1976, taught at the
University of Chicago from 1946 to 1977
and is now a senior research fellow at the
Hoover Institution. This speech, which has
been edited for length, has never before
been published. The full text is available at
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common approach to inflation is to
think that inflation, being a rise in
prices, results from a rise in costs.
With rare exceptions, every business-
man and every ordinary person tends
to think that the reason why prices go
up is because they are pushed up
because costs go up. This may take
the form of a so-called cost-push 
spiral or wage-price spiral or other
fancy terms, or it may take the sim-
pler form of each man thinking he has
to raise prices because his costs have
gone up. It is perfectly natural that
people should think this way because
to each individual separately that is
the way it looks. But the fact is that
this has almost never been the source
of inflation. It’s the external manifes-
tation of inflation, but not its source.
Indeed, this illustrates a much
more general principle. What makes
economics, in my opinion, a fascinat-
ing subject is that for almost any
important proposition in economics,
what’s true for the individual is pre-
cisely the opposite of what’s true for
everybody together. That’s why you
have so many widespread economic
fallacies. People generalize from their
individual experience, and yet that is
precisely the opposite of what holds
for the community as a whole. Let me
illustrate that in a very simple way,
which is also related to the problem of 
inflation. Each one of us separately
thinks he can decide how many of
these green pieces of paper to keep in
his pocket — subject, of course, to his
total wealth. If any one of us wants to
keep $20 more in his pocket, all he has
to do is cash a check for $20 or sell a
bond for $20 or use $20 of his income
and keep it in cash instead of spending
it or investing it in some other way. 
So each person separately thinks he
can decide how much money to hold
in his pocket, and each one is right.
Yet for the community as a whole, the
amount of currency to be held in 
pockets is a fixed number. There are
only so many pieces of these green
pieces of paper that have been print-
ed. The way that you get more in your
pocket is by persuading somebody
else to hold less. This is a game of
musical chairs in which the pieces of
paper pass around. While each indi-
vidual separately can decide how
much to have, the community as a
whole has nothing to say about how
many pieces of paper there shall be 
to pass around. That’s determined 
by the Federal Reserve Board or the
Treasury or by some central agency.
Whatever that amount is, it’s shuffled
around from person to person.
I think that’s a very clear and
straightforward example of how it is
that the way it appears to the individ-
ual is the opposite from the way it
appears to the community. The same
thing is true with respect to inflation.
The example I can give you which
will bring this out most clearly is one
which I have taken from a recent
textbook in elementary economics.
The authors, Armen Alchian and
William Allen, have a wonderful little
story in their book that will illustrate
how it is that to each individual sepa-
rately it looks as if what causes
inflation is a rise in costs even though
to everybody together what causes it
is an increase in demand, a monetary 
phenomenon. Let us suppose, they 
say, that all of a sudden the house-
wives of America decided that they
wanted to serve more meat on their
tables, and so come Monday morning
each one goes to the butcher and
buys more meat. No butcher raises
his price. He just sells out his meat
and then he orders a larger amount of
meat from the wholesaler. The whole-
salers sell out and so they order the
larger amount of meat from the 
packer. The packer finds his inven-
tory going down and so he sends back
instructions to the cattle buyers at
the auctions to buy more animals.
Well, of course, there aren’t any more
animals to be bought, so what 
happens is that the people trying to
buy them bid up the price of the ani-
mals. They report to the packing
houses, “We’re sorry we’ve had to pay
a higher price for the animals.” The
packing houses say, “Our costs have
gone up so we must charge a higher
price,” so they charge a higher price
to the wholesalers. The wholesalers
say, “Our costs have gone up so we
must charge a higher price,” so they
charge a higher price to the retailers.
The butchers say to the housewives
when next they come in, “We’re very
sorry to have to do this to you; it 
isn’t our doing, but our costs have
gone up so we have to charge you a
higher price.” Everybody along this
chain, except way back at that auc-
tion where there is nobody who has
any costs that he can look at in the
same sense, is honestly charging high-
er prices because his costs have gone
up. And yet, taken altogether, the
increase in prices clearly reflects the
increase in demand at the final stage. 
That is the way it is in the economy
at large. Every manufacturer says, “I
have to charge higher prices because
my wages have gone up,” but the 
reason his wages have gone up is
because there’s been an increase in
demand somewhere else which has led
somebody else to try to bid his work-
ers away from him, or he’s been trying
to bid workers away from somewhere
else. The ultimate source of the
increase in price has been an increase
in monetary demand.
And now we ask the question,
where does that increase in monetary
demand come from? If there has been
any substantial increase in monetary
demand, it always has had the same
basic source. Somebody has produced
more money. The exact source of
additional money has varied from
time to time. In the period after 1896,
after William Jennings Bryan was
defeated in the campaign for free 
silver, prices rose in the United States
from 1896 to 1913 by roughly 35 per-
cent. That price rise came from an
increase in the quantity of money
which occurred because some smart
people had figured out how to apply
the cyanide process to extract gold
from low-grade ore. The resulting
great increase in the production of
gold brought about an increase in the 
quantity of money, which in turn
brought about inflation. 
To go back to my main theme, on
that occasion, inflation reflected an
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the particular reason why the quantity
of money increased varies from time
to time. On that occasion it increased
because of gold. In World War I and
World War II, in the United States the
quantity of money increased very rap-
idly because government printed it to
finance the war. Go back to the great
price inflation in Europe in the 16th
and 17th centuries and that came
because of the discoveries of specie in
the New World. There have been
many reasons why the quantity of
money has increased, but inflation has
never occurred to the best of my
knowledge except as a consequence of
a more rapid increase in the quantity
of money than in output. 
In modern times, the quantity of
money is under the control of govern-
mental agencies. In the United States,
it is determined by the Federal
Reserve Board, the Treasury, the mon-
etary authorities. And that means that
if inflation is always a consequence of
an increase in the quantity of money,
the responsibility for inflation is
always governmental. But, of course,
as you know, no human being likes to
take responsibility for things that are
unpleasant or undesirable and so no
governmental official likes to stand up
in front of an audience and say, 
“Mea culpa, I’m responsible for infla-
tion.” What always happens is that
the governmental officials stand up
and say, if we have inflation it’s
because of those rapacious business-
men and those selfish union labor
leaders. If those people would only
stop demanding more and more, high-
er and higher wages and higher and
higher prices, there would be no infla-
tion. And the businessmen and the
wage union leaders, surprisingly
enough, tend to accept the indictment
because of their misunderstanding
of the elementary economic point
I’ve been trying to present here.
The businessmen tend to say that
the reason we have inflation is because
those selfish unions push up wages, 
and the union leaders say the reason
we have inflation is because those 
selfish businessmen raise prices and,
therefore, we’ve got to get higher
wages to have the same real income for
our employees. So you have a situation
in which the government, to blame
somebody else, attributes inflation to
a wage-cost spiral, and the business-
men and the labor union leaders
accept the blame and say, yes, we 
are  guilty. Yet in fact, as I have empha-
sized, the inflation arises from one 
and only one reason: an increase in a 
quantity of money. 
That is my first point. The next
point I want to discuss is the harm
that is done by trying to stop inflation
by holding down wages and prices.
The president, members of the
Council of Economic Advisers, and
other prominent public officials make
speeches about the terrible effects 
of inflation and about the urgent
necessity for businessmen and labor
union leaders to exercise a social
responsibility in holding down wages
and prices. Maybe the cause of infla-
tion is an increasing quantity of
money, but you may well ask, what
harm would it do to try to stop it by
holding down those wages and those
prices?
In the first place, one of the major
sources of harm it does is to lead 
people and the government to mis-
conceive the nature of the problem. 
If the businessmen and the labor 
leaders accept the blame, the govern-
ment goes on pouring coal into the
furnace, increasing the quantity of
money, and says that any resulting
inflation is not its fault. So you tend to
encourage a delay in adopting the
remedy which alone can prove effec-
tive, namely, a slowing down in the
rate of growth in the quantity of
money. That’s only a minor reason
why it is harmful. A second reason is
that it isn’t going to stop inflation. It’s
like taking a great big balloon and
thinking that by pressing one corner
of it you are going to deflate the bal-
loon. All you do is push the air into
the other part of the balloon. In the
same way, if you succeed in holding
down some wages and some prices, all
that does is push the inflationary
pressure over somewhere else and
make it stronger there. Suppose you
succeed in keeping down, let us say,
the price of steel which has attracted
so much attention. That would simply
mean that the purchasers of steel have
more money left after buying steel
than they would otherwise have had
and they can now spend it on bidding
something else up. If you keep down
the wage rate of labor under these cir-
cumstances, it just means that the
employers have more money to pro-
duce inflation somewhere else, so all
you are doing is shoving the inflation-
ary pressure over. 
But you may say, that’s only
because we haven’t gone far enough. If
we really spread our net wide, if we
held down every wage and every price,
there’s no place for the inflationary
pressure to go. That’s true, but let’s
look and see what the consequences
would be. The consequences of that
would be to destroy the price system
as a means of organizing economic
activity and you would have to 
substitute something else. What else
would you substitute? If prices are not
going to determine who buys how
much, something else must do it.
Let me give you a historical 
example which perhaps makes my
point most strikingly about the impor-
tance of the distinction between 
open and suppressed inflation. It has a
very real parallel with strong implica-
tions for the United States although
it’s a much more extreme case. The
best example, because it’s almost a
controlled experiment, is a compari-
son of experience in Germany after
World War I and World War II. As 
you recall, after World War I in
Germany there was an inflation that
really was an inflation. It was a hyper-
inflation. A student of mine some
years back, Phillip Cagan, wrote a 
classic study of hyper-inflations, and
he defined a hyper-inflation as begin-
ning when prices rose more than 
50 percent a month. In Germany 
during the height of hyper-inflation,
there were periods when prices were 
doubling every day. In fact, it got to
the point that employers were paying
their workers salaries three times a day
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they could go out and spend it before
it lost value. That was really an infla-
tion. Prices went up by amounts that
you have to reckon by 10 to the 10th or
10 to the 20th, something like that. 
The hyper-inflation did tremen-
dous harm of a social kind. It destroyed
the German middle classes, and it
undoubtedly laid much of the socio-
logical basis for the subsequent
emergence of Hitler. But from a pure-
ly economic point of view, the striking
thing about it is that, except for 
the last few months of the hyper-
inflation, the level of economic activi-
ty remained high. Inflation was open,
prices were free to rise, there were 
no price controls of any kind, and,
consequently, people were free to 
continue to do business. There were
certain kinds of inefficiencies pro-
duced but you never had any major
decline in the aggregate level of 
production. Indeed, as you may 
recall, 1920 to 1921 saw a worldwide
depression. In the United States
prices fell by nearly 50 percent from
1920 to 1921. Germany was almost the
only country in the world to escape
that depression. While the rest of the
world was having a decline in output,
Germany was booming. There was an
artificial kind of a boom that had
great social costs, but from the purely 
technical point of view, the inflation
did not prevent the economy from
operating.
After World War II, Germany 
was again faced with an inflationary
problem, but it was an inflationary
problem of enormously smaller
scope. Prices rose about fourfold.
Now that seems like a big inflation
and it is. For prices to go up to 400
percent of their initial value is a sub-
stantial price rise. But it is negligible
by comparison to what happened
after World War I. Yet that rise was
not permitted to happen openly after
World War II. There was widespread
price control. Under those circum-
stances, price control can almost
never be enforced. From the time of
the Roman Empire to the present,
you cannot in general enforce price
controls when there is that big a dis-
crepancy between the market price
and the controlled price. 
But Germany from 1945 to 1948 
was an exception because there was an
American, a French, and a British occu-
pation army there, and they were
enforcing the price controls. So you
had about as well-enforced price 
controls as you could imagine. The
result was that, because this inflation
was suppressed, the prices were not
allowed to find their own level, and
output in Germany was cut in half.
Walter Eucken, a German economist,
wrote a wonderful article on this 
experience in which he tells the story
of workers in a factory making alu-
minum pots and pans who would work
in that factory for three days a week.
They would receive their pay in the
form of some of the pots and pans they
had helped to produce. They would
spend the rest of the week scouring the
countryside trying to find a farmer
who was willing to trade them some
potatoes for those pots and pans.            
The problem is, if you don’t let
prices rise, you destroy the system
which organizes the economy, the
price system which coordinates the
activities of different people. You
force people into the inefficiency of
barter, or a man producing pots and
pans trying to find a man who has
potatoes, instead of selling the pots
and pans for money and using the
money to buy the potatoes. And so
Germany with a very much smaller
inflationary pressure had an enor-
mously greater reduction in its
economic output. Indeed, the action
taken in response to this episode is the
reason Ludwig Erhard is chancellor of
Germany today. 
One Sunday in 1948, Erhard, who
was economics minister then, released
an announcement that all price 
controls were abandoned. He did it 
on Sunday because that was the 
day on which the Allied offices of 
military occupation were closed and 
so they couldn’t contradict his order.
Immediately, there was a very sizable
rise in recorded prices, but immedi-
ately also the price system started
operating again. That was the source
of the German economic miracle, as it
came to be called, which produced a 
tremendous increase in the total out-
put of Germany over the next year or
two. There was no mystery about it. 
It had nothing to do with the capacity
of the German people for hard work 
or with any special wisdom of the
American occupation authorities or
with any assistance from us to them. 
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an efficient money system for an 
inefficient barter system. 
The money system is so important
that if you prevent it from operating
efficiently something else will come
along. In the period
from 1945 to 1948
in Germany, as 




use cigarettes as a
form of money: cig-
arettes for small
transactions and Cognac for big ones.
That was when they really started talk-
ing about the importance of having
adequate liquidity. And you may
remember that there were stories in
American newspapers of this time 
saying something like, “Look at these
crazy Germans. They just got beaten
in the war and they are poor and 
devastated. Yet they are willing to 
pay $1.50 for a package of cigarettes.
How silly can they be?” The answer, 
of course, is that they were no more
silly than you are when you’re willing
to pay $10 for a piece of paper (a $10
bill) that’s only worth a penny as paper.
You don’t pay $10 for this piece of
paper in order to burn it or to write
notes on it. Neither were the Germans
paying $1.50 or $2 for a package of 
cigarettes in order to smoke them.
That was money because prices in
terms of cigarettes were not con-
trolled, and it developed as a very
inefficient substitute money. 
The repressed inflation in
Germany was far more destructive of
economic output and productivity
than the open inflation after World
War I. And this is true more generally.
Let me come back to the United
States to see some parallels in very
small ways. Not long ago, there was
pressure on American copper produc-
ers not to raise the price of copper.
The next step, of course, is that, since
copper is selling for a higher price
abroad than it is at home, everybody
wants to export it and nobody wants
to import it. People want to buy it
from copper producers at home. 
The next step is to impose export 
quotas on copper. Now if you want to
export copper, you are prohibited from
doing so unless you can get a permit
from the Department of Commerce.
This is inevitable. If
you are going to fix 
the price of copper,
then you will have
to decide who shall
buy copper at that
lower price, and so
it goes all down 
the line. 
We have so far
in the United States had the most
extensive experience with repressed
inflation in an area where it is 
most destructive, namely, foreign
exchange. We have been pegging for
some years now the price of the
pound sterling in terms of the dollar,
the price of francs in terms of the dol-
lar, the price of gold in terms of the
dollar, and so on. And we have had
the usual consequences from price
fixing. You know, economists may not
know very much, but there’s one
thing we know. We know how to pro-
duce either surpluses or shortages.
You just tell us what you want. If you
want to have a surplus, we’ll tell you
to set the price too high. Have a high
price on wheat and you’ll be sure
you’ll have wheat running out of your
bins. If you want a shortage, we’ll tell
you to set a low price. Put rent con-
trol on rental quarters in New York,
and you’ll be sure you will have a
shortage of dwelling units to rent at
that price.
We’ve been doing pretty well in the
case of silver with first creating a 
surplus and then creating a shortage.
We’ve had it both ways in that case.
Incidentally, the story of silver is fasci-
nating. In the 1930s, we had a silver
purchase program that, as it hap-
pened, was one of the main reasons
why China is communist today. I
won’t go into that one right now,
except to note that under the silver
purchase program we raised the price
of silver in one year from 25 cents an
ounce to 75 cents an ounce and sub-
sequently to 90 cents. Of course, this
brought a tremendous inflow of silver
into the U.S. Treasury just as our price
fixing in wheat did. We kept the price
of silver at the same level and in the
meantime prices in general more than
doubled. Hence, a very high price
became a very low price and now, in
order to prevent the price of silver
from rising above $1.30, we’ve had to
sell silver out of these stocks. We’ve
had a shortage and, as you know, we’ve
substituted Federal Reserve notes for
silver certificates, and sandwich coins
for solid coins. So we know how to
produce shortages or surpluses.
That’s what has been happening in
the foreign exchange market. We’ve
been pegging the price of the dollar.
The result has been a whole series of
direct interferences with individuals
and with trade. You know as individ-
uals some of the minor irritants,
things like the reduction of the duty-
free allowance tourists can bring in.
Much more important has been the
interest-equalization tax which has
established a differential exchange
rate, a devalued exchange rate for 
capital transactions. Also, there are 
oil import quotas, copper export 
quotas, and I can’t begin to name the
host of specific quantitative controls
that have been promoted by the
attempt to peg exchange rates.
I mentioned foreign exchange 
pegging because that is a particularly
important type. The example that
comes to mind in this case as a 
cautionary tale of where it can lead
you to is India. India is a country
which has been having inflation over
the past decade or so, and it has been
repressing it the way in which we 
have been trying to repress it here.
The key in India is the exchange 
rate of the rupee. The official price 
of the rupee is 21 cents, 4.7 rupees to
the dollar. If the rupee was worth 
21 cents five or 10 years ago it is 
certainly not worth it now because
prices have gone up 30 or 40 or 50
percent. I’m not sure of the latest 
figures. But India has tried to main-
tain that exchange rate. The result is,
of course, that everybody wants to
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So you then have quotas and exchange
permits on imports and subsidies on
exports. You have to ration imports 
of steel, copper, and so on. 
The next stage is it becomes of
great economic value to have an
import permit. Indeed, if you ask
what has been the major source of
new fortunes in the last 20 years in
the world, including the United
States, there is no doubt it has been
getting the ear of governmental offi-
cials to get special permits, whether 
it be to have a single television 
station or to have a permit to import
copper. In India this is very wide-
spread. There’s enormous corruption
and bribery involved in the exchange
permit system. Indeed, the major
obstacle to having a devaluation of
the rupee exchange rate or allowing
the rupee to go free is that there 
are now so many people who have
vested interests in the exchange rate
system because they have the import
licenses. 
Exactly the same thing is true in
this country. The permit to export
copper is a valuable thing now. I 
mentioned the TV and radio stations,
and that’s a special example of the
same kind of thing. Here you have
something that’s worth several mil-
lions of dollars if you get it, and if you
get it, you get it for nothing. Then 
people are surprised why there should
always be charges of corruption and
bribery in connection with television
and radio licenses. 
To come back to my main theme,
the effect of trying to hold down
prices by suppressing individual
prices and wages is to eliminate the
central governor of the economic sys-
tem, the central method by which we
organize our economic activity. If you
insist on doing that, you are going to
have to substitute something else.
You are going to have to engage in
rationing and indirect controls. You
are going to have to decide who shall
buy from whom and how much. 
The effect, therefore, of trying to 
stop inflation by holding down 
individual prices and individual wages
is to introduce enormous inefficien-
cies and to expand very greatly the
scope and extent of direct controls. 
This, in turn, has a further effect
which is the final consequence I want
to mention of trying to stop inflation
by holding down prices and wages. 
The effect is of a political character.
We have had a number of episodes in
the past five or six years in which
there’s been an attempt to hold down
wages and prices. We had the
Kennedy confrontation with the steel
industry in 1962. We had the more
recent episode with aluminum. The
interesting thing to me is the drastic
change that occurred between the
first and the second episode in the
willingness of businesspeople who
were potentially affected by it to
speak out freely and express their sen-
timents about it. And I don’t blame
them. 
There is no legal authority whatso-
ever whereby the president or any
other official has the power to require
the aluminum company or the steel
company to hold down its prices or a
union to hold down its wage rates.
There is no official authority, but
there is lots of power lying around
Washington. There are lots of extra-
legal pressures that can be brought 
to bear. After all, there’s hardly a man
in the country who cannot now be
subjected to great inconvenience by
having a tax official suddenly decide
that his return needs extra careful
scrutiny — and which return doesn’t?
The threat of antitrust action is 
not something which any business-
man is going to take lightly. There is a
wide range of governmental contracts
that are available. The attempt to hold
down particular wages and prices 
produces a resort to extra-legal power,
which, in its turn, tends to spread and 
to lead to a suppression of individual
and personal and political freedom
and to a great lessening of the willing-
ness of people to dissent. These are
some of the consequences of the
attempt to stop inflation by holding
down particular prices and wages.
I think they are extremely serious
both from the point of view of eco-
nomic efficiency and from the point of
view of the preservation of political
freedom. If we are going to have 
inflationary pressure we should have it
open — let prices rise, let it go. Better
yet, of course, would be to remove the
source of the inflationary pressure by
slowing  the rate of expansion of
money. 
After the 1960 recession, itself 
largely produced by a sharp retard-
ation in monetary growth, indeed an
absolute decline, the Federal Reserve
System did the right thing by increas-
ing the rate of growth. They have also
done the right thing by maintaining a
fairly high rate of monetary growth.
This is the main source of our long
continued expansion. Unfortunately,
however, they overdid a good thing
and expanded the quantity of money
at too high a rate. This has built into
our society some pressures driving
toward higher prices. We cannot elim-
inate this pressure and stop the
inflation without paying a price. The
danger is that if we try to do so, as we
sooner or later will have to, by curtail-
ing the growth of the quantity of
money, that we will go too far, that we
will overdo the reaction. Even if we
don’t overdo the reaction, there is no
way of bringing inflation to a halt sud-
denly. There is already built into the
economy forces for making price
increases.
If you were to take the correct and
proper measures, which is to slow
down gradually the rate of growth of
the quantity of money, there will for 
a time be a continuation of inflation
at the same time that we experience
some measure of recession and un-
employment. That is part of the price
we are going to pay for having in the
past three or four years stepped on
the accelerator too hard. But that will
be far better and a far lower price than 
to continue along our present lines of
trying to conceal the inflationary 
pressure by appealing to the social 
responsibility of business leaders and
labor leaders, reinforced by an appeal 
to unnamed and unspecified exercise 
of governmental power. 
Thank you. RF
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